|  Author | Topic: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice? (Read 143 times) |
Danny Shahar
Administrator
member is offline
![[avatar]](http://www.coasttocoastam.com/timages/page/rhodes0622c.jpg)
![[homepage]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/buttons/www_sm.gif)
Joined: Jul 2008
Gender: Male 
Posts: 31
|  | Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Thread Started on Dec 16, 2008, 11:32pm » | |
In his book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, John Rawls wrote that there are:
...profound and irreconcilable differences in citizens' reasonable comprehensive religious and philosophical conceptions of the world, and in their views of the moral and aesthetic values to be sought in human life.
Rawls suggested that these differences, which he called "reasonable pluralism," were a persistent feature of free societies. This, he thought, would prevent political society from being a "community," where a community was defined as "a body of persons united in affirming the same comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrine."
Does reasonable pluralism extend to principles of justice? If so, would this undermine an attempt to arrive at a coherent political philosophy?
| |
|
rjmii
Junior Member
member is offline
![[avatar]](http://assets.blogcatalog.com/avatar/usr/169595.gif)
Joseph Schumpeter
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 50
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #1 on Dec 17, 2008, 4:26pm » | |
Rawls suggested that these differences, which he called "reasonable pluralism," were a persistent feature of free societies.
Although I have only a cursory familiarity with Rawls, I would agree with this. Firstly, I do not believe in a unitarian justice, be it 'natural law' or legislated law. There are simply not objective facts of value which one is compelled to follow. Since there is no extra-personal value there is likewise no extra-personal determinant of what inter-personal relationships ought to accord with.
A plurality of justice is probably a necessary consequence of individual consciousness (and thus valuation) in the real world. Even supposing all the conventions were standardized, the practice of proportionality in 'crime and punishment' would still be entirely a matter of organic development.
Political philosophy is, depending on how defined, itself an incoherent prospect. It largely amounts to assertions about the desirability of certain ends. We may agree or disagree, but since questions of justice and property are matters of socio-historic development the coherence of the words bandied about in political philosophy, especially the popular sort, seems to reduce political philosophy to a presumptuous sibling of political theory; not merely making assertions about what is but assertions about what 'ought' to be. While we humans may be teleologic entities, I think that the Universe is demonstrably not.
| |
|
Danny Shahar
Administrator
member is offline
Joined: Jul 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 31
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #2 on Dec 17, 2008, 9:50pm » | |
I'm not entirely sure that I agree about the necessary incoherence of political philosophy, though I acknowledge the qualification you made with regard to its definition. As a provisional definition, could we consider political philosophy to be the pursuit of an understanding of an appropriate way to live together? Why couldn't political philosophy ask, "Given the differences in our values and worldviews, how should we seek to live with each other?" It seems to me that the right answer has something to do with the idea of living and letting live. As David Schmidtz wrote in his book, Elements of Justice:
In effect, there are two ways to agree: We agree on what is correct, or on who has jurisdiction -- who gets to decide. Freedom of religion took the latter form; we learned to be liberals in matters of religion, reaching consensus not on what to believe but on who gets to decide. So too with freedom of speech. Isn’t it odd that our greatest successes in learning to live together stem not from agreeing on what is correct but from agreeing to let people decide for themselves?
| |
|
morty
New Member
member is offline
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 33
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #3 on Dec 18, 2008, 12:43am » | |
Dec 17, 2008, 4:26pm, rjmii wrote:| Firstly, I do not believe in a unitarian justice, be it 'natural law' or legislated law. There are simply not objective facts of value which one is compelled to follow. Since there is no extra-personal value there is likewise no extra-personal determinant of what inter-personal relationships ought to accord with. |
|
I would tend to disagree, likely due to our disagreement over the possibility of an extra-personal determinant of value, however.
I think that justice, by its very nature, must be objective and precise. A criminal has an exact amount of restitution/retribution/punishment which can be justly meted out against him. Justice, as I see it, is a prescription for the proper actions to be taken against a criminal. I do not go so far as to claim that it is immoral to refrain from carrying out a just sentence, but merely that it is, strictly speaking, unjust.
I freely grant, however, that there are serious (possibly insurmountable?) epistemological problems in discovering what justice entails in any particular case. The factors are near-limitless, further muddied by not knowing whether all relevant information regarding a case is known. We can make general statements, such as, it is likely unjust for capital punishment to be the penalty for stepping on someone's toe, and it is also likely unjust for a mass murderer to only receive a five dollar fine. But as the epistemological grey areas (note: not actual grey areas) expand in a particular case, it becomes harder and harder to discern what justice entails. An even greater trouble is that as we near the answer of "what is just in this case?" the grey areas will necessarily become more pronounced, as we are dealing with finer and finer distinctions.
As such, I think it is legitimate and sensible to set up organizations/services which specialize in determining the proper penalties for criminal activity. These should have rules which are agreed upon ahead of time for what sorts of penalties are given for what sorts of crimes, based on member-opinion regarding justice. This skirts the problem entirely, as morality (as far as I see it) demands nothing in terms of justice once a voluntary agreement overrides it.
The only trouble, then, is dealing with those who have not agreed. Two possibilities exist here: 1) they are part of another organization, 2) they have not agreed to be a part of any organization. With 1), the solution is rather simple, an agreement between the two organizations must be made for inter-organizational judgment. Plenty of libertarian ink has been spilled on why they would do this, how, and so on. With 2), I must conclude that morality would demand treading very carefully with them. Any violent responses, even to crimes as serious as murder, are potentially suspect, and people would be best served to use non-violent means of penalizing the (alleged) aggressor. Immediate self-defense, as always, is perfectly valid, of course, but beyond that, significant evidence (e.g., someone clearly witnessed the crime) would be necessary for any pursuit of the criminal to be valid.
So, I suppose my position could be thusly summarized: Justice makes certain demands upon us for any penalty to be considered "just" and all other penalties are necessarily unjust. However, the just solution can rarely, if ever, be known. Therefore, we must use voluntary organizations to determine penalties for crimes.
In principle, I oppose pluralistic accounts of justice, but in practice, I recognize their necessity.
| |
|
rjmii
Junior Member
member is offline
Joseph Schumpeter
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 50
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #4 on Dec 18, 2008, 2:32am » | |
As a provisional definition, could we consider political philosophy to be the pursuit of an understanding of an appropriate way to live together? Why couldn't political philosophy ask, "Given the differences in our values and worldviews, how should we seek to live with each other?"
That is not a bad working definition though I would venture that the answer may well rule out 'political' answers as generally understood. This is why I would describe my views as apolitical.
I freely grant, however, that there are serious (possibly insurmountable?) epistemological problems in discovering what justice entails in any particular case. The factors are near-limitless, further muddied by not knowing whether all relevant information regarding a case is known. We can make general statements, such as, it is likely unjust for capital punishment to be the penalty for stepping on someone's toe, and it is also likely unjust for a mass murderer to only receive a five dollar fine.
While I agree with the general provisions of proportionality, I am not sure what sort of connection this would have to ethical norms. I also question whether such a connection is necessary as some people seem to think it is. Justice, as it stands in most relationships, is something that can and does develop from common interests and equilibrium solutions. I think that one of the great mistakes typically made in questions of justice is to presume justice ever had a moral background. I would venture that what ethical elements it has are not so much an underpinning as a facade added later.
| |
|
morty
New Member
member is offline
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 33
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #5 on Dec 18, 2008, 2:58pm » | |
I would agree that justice is not merely a subset of morality (and needs to appeal to no particular morality), but I believe that morality must be informed by justice in circumstances where it is applicable. Justice assumes no prior agreement on rightful sanction, therefore, morality only needs to refer to it in that particular situation. But in those situations, morality would demand that justice set bounds on the responses to criminality.
| |
|
Danny Shahar
Administrator
member is offline
Joined: Jul 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 31
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #6 on Dec 18, 2008, 8:25pm » | |
Dec 18, 2008, 12:43am, morty wrote:| I think that justice, by its very nature, must be objective and precise. A criminal has an exact amount of restitution/retribution/punishment which can be justly meted out against him. Justice, as I see it, is a prescription for the proper actions to be taken against a criminal. |
|
Morty, I wonder if you might not be mistaken about this. It seems to me that, in light of the subjectivity of value and the nonexistence of units of "injustice" or "punishment," there may be no such thing as an "exact amount of restitution/retribution/punishment" which equates precisely with the injustice perpetrated by a criminal.
I don't mean to suggest that injustice is nothing more than a personal opinion, with no more weight than a preference for Chunky Monkey over Rocky Road. As David Hume wrote in his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals:
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak in the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of vicew, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony.
But although we appeal to common moral experience in discussing injustice, I don't believe we can coherently try to measure injustice as if it were an extant thing. I think it's probably closer to the idea of "utility," where we know basically what others mean when they say that things are "good" or "awful" or "fantastic," but it's not like those descriptions are inherent qualities in the objects themselves that can be measured and quantified.
| |
|
rjmii
Junior Member
member is offline
Joseph Schumpeter
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 50
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #7 on Dec 18, 2008, 8:31pm » | |
Dec 18, 2008, 8:25pm, Danny Shahar wrote:
Dec 18, 2008, 12:43am, morty wrote:| I think that justice, by its very nature, must be objective and precise. A criminal has an exact amount of restitution/retribution/punishment which can be justly meted out against him. Justice, as I see it, is a prescription for the proper actions to be taken against a criminal. |
|
Morty, I wonder if you might not be mistaken about this. It seems to me that, in light of the subjectivity of value and the nonexistence of units of "injustice" or "punishment," there may be no such thing as an "exact amount of restitution/retribution/punishment" which equates precisely with the injustice perpetrated by a criminal.
I don't mean to suggest that injustice is nothing more than a personal opinion, with no more weight than a preference for Chunky Monkey over Rocky Road. As David Hume wrote in his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals:
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak in the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of vicew, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony.
But although we appeal to common moral experience in discussing injustice, I don't believe we can coherently try to measure injustice as if it were an extant thing. I think it's probably closer to the idea of "utility," where we know basically what others mean when they say that things are "good" or "awful" or "fantastic," but it's not like those descriptions are inherent qualities in the objects themselves that can be measured and quantified. |
|
Exactly, even if we agree to some set of conventions or rules we nonetheless have to engage in pragmatic economic resolutions in areas of proportionality and the limits of what constitute interference. There is no escaping the fact that the world we live in is complex and our own values are personal ones.
| |
|
morty
New Member
member is offline
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 33
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #8 on Dec 18, 2008, 10:31pm » | |
Dec 18, 2008, 8:25pm, Danny Shahar wrote:| Morty, I wonder if you might not be mistaken about this. It seems to me that, in light of the subjectivity of value and the nonexistence of units of "injustice" or "punishment," there may be no such thing as an "exact amount of restitution/retribution/punishment" which equates precisely with the injustice perpetrated by a criminal. |
|
That's not exactly what I was trying to say, but in retrospect, I can see where you might be led to that interpretation.
On clarification, my claim is that the concept of justice, so far as I understand it, demands that it be objective and a precise prescription of action. That is, when we talk about justice, we generally assume such a construction. My claim is not that there is some quantifiable "measure of injustice" or any such thing, but rather that there is only one set of actions which are "just" in any particular situation and that this is not dependent upon our subjective preferences regarding the issue. E.g., even if we thought of murder as a lesser crime than assault ceteris paribus, it would still be "unjust" to assign penalties in that way (that's not to say I think it would be wrong to do so, assuming voluntary agreement by all parties).
But, as I mentioned before, I don't think that information regarding what justice entails in any particular situation is readily accessible to us. We can't go out and "observe justice" like we could go look at a tree. At best, we might be able to come up with general principles to analyze situations.
I absolutely recognize your points when it comes to a practical application of justice; subjectivity, societal values, pragmatism, and so on all seep into any real legal decision. But, in principle, I have to hold that justice is swayed by none of these and remains a consistent and objective prescription.
| |
|
rjmii
Junior Member
member is offline
Joseph Schumpeter
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 50
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #9 on Dec 19, 2008, 12:52am » | |
But, in principle, I have to hold that justice is swayed by none of these and remains a consistent and objective prescription.
Just what is supposed to make this 'objective', what 'objectivity' we are to observe and why 'principles' need be evoked at all are the questions which one has to answer, however, if one wants to make these sorts of claims about justice.
I will reiterate my point that there are, in fact, no objective values.
| |
|
morty
New Member
member is offline
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 33
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #10 on Dec 19, 2008, 11:26am » | |
And I reiterate my point that when people use the term "justice" they are referring to a concept which includes objectivity. I recognize that some, such as yourself, might not mean that when they say "justice," however, I think if you got inside the heads of most people who used that word, they'd be speaking of an objective prescription.
Do you believe that empirically humanity does not hold objective values or that objective values are impossible?
| |
|
rjmii
Junior Member
member is offline
Joseph Schumpeter
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 50
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #11 on Dec 19, 2008, 5:59pm » | |
Dec 19, 2008, 11:26am, morty wrote:
Do you believe that empirically humanity does not hold objective values or that objective values are impossible? |
|
They are literally impossible. There is no possibility of the existence of a value except in relation to a specific end and the perception a person has about means. While values may be Catholic (Universal), even so they are not 'objective', if every human holds the same value it nonetheless is not the same and quite possibly conflicting with all others who hold their own (essentially similar) value. In point of fact, however, we know that interpersonal value comparisons can not be made so whether values are 'empirically' the same is dubious at best. But more to the point, there is no value without an end and a view of the means for achieving that; means-ends relationship ideas are value.
| |
|
morty
New Member
member is offline
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 33
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #12 on Dec 19, 2008, 9:49pm » | |
What evidence do you have to make this assertion?
| |
|
rjmii
Junior Member
member is offline
Joseph Schumpeter
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 50
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #13 on Dec 19, 2008, 9:58pm » | |
Dec 19, 2008, 9:49pm, morty wrote:| What evidence do you have to make this assertion? |
|
You could read my post here:
The concept of value implies a valuer. Values can not be had by no one. Value is (factually) the process of evaluating means for the capacity to achieve satisfaction. But by definition this evaluation is derived from the distinct characteristics of the actor (which are existentially and materially unique) and his ideas about what means exist to achieve satisfaction (also existentially and materially unique). Teleology can not be divorced from means-satisfaction relationships, that is what it is defined by.
| |
|
morty
New Member
member is offline
Joined: Dec 2008
Gender: Male
Posts: 33
| | Re: Is there reasonable pluralism about justice?
« Reply #14 on Dec 19, 2008, 11:19pm » | |
Dec 19, 2008, 9:58pm, rjmii wrote:
You could read my post here:
The concept of value implies a valuer. Values can not be had by no one. Value is (factually) the process of evaluating means for the capacity to achieve satisfaction. But by definition this evaluation is derived from the distinct characteristics of the actor (which are existentially and materially unique) and his ideas about what means exist to achieve satisfaction (also existentially and materially unique). Teleology can not be divorced from means-satisfaction relationships, that is what it is defined by. |
|
I read your post and it remains a mere assertion. You are asserting that value is wholly made up of the subjective preferences of valuers. But you give no reason as to why this is the case. Claiming that the concept of value implies a valuer only begs the question - you assume that all value is subjective.
| |
| |
|
![[Home]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/menu/home.gif)
![[Help]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/menu/help.gif)
![[Search]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/menu/search.gif)
![[Login]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/menu/login.gif)
![[Register]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/menu/register.gif)
![[Search This Thread]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/search2.gif)
![[Send Topic To Friend]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/buttons/sendtopic.gif)
![[Print]](http://s1.images.proboards.com/buttons/print.gif)
Logged